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Growing Pains: Using Racketeering Law to Protect 
Property Rights from State-Sanctioned Marijuana 
Operations 
I. Introduction 
In June 2018, Oklahoma voters legalized medical marijuana, making it 
the thirtieth state to legalize marijuana for either medical or adult 
(“recreational”) use.1 Legalization caused a scramble among state 
lawmakers and local governments to pass laws and promulgate regulations 
to administer this highly debated and often divisive industry.2 Of course, 
Oklahoma is not the first state to experience these growing pains, and the 
fact that others have gone before might make Oklahoma’s path easier. 
Although commentators often focus on marijuana’s impact on the criminal 
justice system, medical community, and federal-state government 
relations,3 legalization may have an underdiscussed and acute effect on 
property owners. For example, imagine a property owner in rural Oklahoma 
accustomed to enjoying the simple beauty of its open skies when one fall 
morning the distinct “skunk-like” odor from a neighbor’s marijuana harvest 
comes sweeping down the plain, settling above this rural oasis. Or, perhaps, 
a small diner on the main street in a small community experiences the 
congregation of dispensary patrons in front of the diner’s entryway who are 
illegally selling recently purchased medical marijuana to non-licensed users 
on the diner’s premises. What happens when a neighbor’s state-authorized 
marijuana activities interfere with another’s ability to enjoy and use real 
                                                                                                                 
 1. Tom Angell, Oklahoma Voters Legalize Marijuana for Medical Use, FORBES (June 
26, 2018, 10:11 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/tomangell/2018/06/26/oklahoma-voters-
legalize-marijuana-for-medical-use/#20ab30791374. 
 2. See OSDH Issues Statement on Passage of State Question 788, OKLA. STATE DEP’T 
OF HEALTH OFFICE OF COMMC’NS (June 26, 2018), https://www.ok.gov/triton/ 
modules/newsroom/newsroom_article.php?id=150&article_id=43583; Oklahoma State 
Department of Health Working to Implement Medical Marijuana Measure, KFOR.COM 
(June 27, 2018, 10:36 AM), https://kfor.com/2018/06/27/oklahoma-state-department-of-
health-working-to-implement-medical-marijuana-measure/; K. Butcher & Lili Zheng, Gov. 
Mary Fallin Signs Controversial Emergency Rules for Medical Marijuana, KFOR.COM (July 
11, 2018, 3:07 PM), https://kfor.com/2018/07/11/gov-mary-fallin-signs-emergency-rules-
for-medical-marijuana/; Meg Wingerter, Unanswered Questions Remain as Oklahoma 
Medical Marijuana Rolls Out, OKLAHOMAN (Aug. 1, 2018, 5:00 AM), https:// 
oklahoman.com/article/5603267/unanswered-questions-remain-as-oklahoma-medical-
marijuana-rolls-out.  
 3. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Jolene Forman, Allen Hopper & Sam Kamin, Cooperative 
Federalism and Marijuana Regulation, 62 UCLA L. REV. 74, 77 (2015) (“The struggle over 
marijuana regulation is one of the most important federalism conflicts in a generation.”). 
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property? What happens when a state-sanctioned marijuana production 
facility or dispensary moves in next door? As Oklahoma’s nascent medical 
marijuana industry grows, some property owners may find themselves 
struggling to answer such questions. 
Oklahomans may find that the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Safe Streets 
Alliance v. Hickenlooper is a promising tool to address property value 
reductions and nuisances created by state-sanctioned marijuana operations.4 
In Safe Streets Alliance v. Hickenlooper, the Tenth Circuit reversed the 
dismissal of a Colorado case that paired state nuisance law claims with the 
federal Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO).5 
These doctrines granted the federal court subject matter jurisdiction and 
allowed the plaintiffs to target a state-sanctioned marijuana production 
operation.6 In spite of characterizing its holding as “narrow,”7 the Tenth 
Circuit’s decision subsequently inspired property owners in other 
jurisdictions to make similar RICO-based claims against state-sanctioned 
marijuana operations.8 While RICO has the potential to be a useful tool for 
property owners opposed to state-sanctioned marijuana operations in their 
neighborhoods, Safe Streets Alliance v. Hickenlooper and its progeny 
demonstrate that most property owners likely will not receive favorable 
judgments. RICO will not be helpful to most property owners because they 
will be unable to prove that state-sanctioned marijuana operations 
proximately caused “clear and definite” (not speculative) injuries to their 
business or property.9  
This Comment explores how property owners have used RICO to 
combat state-sanctioned marijuana operations when the marijuana 
operations of “Owner A” interfere with the property rights of the rest of the 
world. Part II discusses how RICO became a tool for property owners 
combatting nuisances caused by state-sanctioned marijuana operations and 
what a claimant must do to set the stage for a RICO claim by exploring 
nuisance law and state regulations that may eliminate the causes of injury to 
                                                                                                                 
 4. Safe Sts. All. v. Hickenlooper, 859 F.3d 865, 876, 891 (10th Cir. 2017). 
 5. Id. at 891. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. See infra Part IV.  
 9. Daniel Murner et al., Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations, 55 AM. 
CRIM. L. REV. 1619, 1669 (2018) (“The First, Second, Third, and Seventh circuits follow the 
rule that a RICO cause of action may not accrue unless the amount of damages is clear and 
definite and note speculative. In contrast, the Fourth, Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh circuits hold 
that a RICO cause of action is ripe as long as plaintiff’s injury is sufficiently definable and 
not speculative.”). 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol72/iss2/7
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property. Part III explains the requirements for a RICO claim, with 
particular focus on how that framework applies to medical marijuana. Part 
IV analyzes cases in Colorado, Oregon, California, and Massachusetts to 
demonstrate RICO’s limited utility in combating state-sanctioned marijuana 
operations in Oklahoma. Part V discusses how the outcomes of these cases 
will likely affect the future of RICO claims against state-sanctioned 
marijuana operations and reveals the need for federal action on marijuana 
legalization. Part VI concludes by explaining that, while the RICO cases 
have not helped aggrieved property owners thus far, an ideally situated 
property owner could invoke RICO to recover treble damages for what 
normally would be a state-law nuisance claim. 
II. Tilling the Soil for a RICO Claim 
For RICO to be a useful tool for property owners, a state-sanction 
marijuana operation must cause an injury to the property of another.10 Most 
complaints about state-sanctioned marijuana operations concern odor.11 
Descriptions of marijuana’s pungent odor include phrases such as “skunk-
like” and lemon-like odors mixed with sulfur.12 Terpenes—molecules found 
in the oils of a cannabis plant that repel insects—are responsible for 
marijuana’s distinctive odor.13 While terpenes are common in plants 
generally, marijuana has a higher concentration of terpenes that makes the 
plant more aromatic than others.14 A powerful odor, however, indicates that 
marijuana was harvested at its peak and is desirable among producers and 
consumers.15 Growing or storing marijuana in large quantities magnifies the 
odor and increases the likelihood that neighbors will complain. Further, the 
                                                                                                                 
 10. See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2012). 
 11. See infra Part IV.  
 12. See Thomas Fuller, ‘Dead Skunk’ Stench from Marijuana Farms Outrages 
Californians, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 19, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/19/us/ 
california-marijuana-stink.html.  
 13. Dan Michaels, Where Does Cannabis’ Smell Come From? Learn About Terpenes, 
GREENSTATE (Feb. 27, 2018), https://www.greenstate.com/explained/what-are-terpenes-
understanding-cannabis-aroma-molecules/. 
 14. See id. (“Terpenes are common throughout the plant world, and while cannabis can 
create about 1,000 of them, we’ve catalogued about 20,000 in nature.”). 
 15. Bill Daley, Why Is Pot So Stinky?, CHI. TRIB. (Apr. 20, 2016, 12:42 PM), 
https://www.chicagotribune.com/lifestyles/ct-why-pot-smells-0420-20160420-story.html. 
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marijuana industry creates waste that may be difficult to dispose of under 
state and local regulations.16 
State-law nuisance claims generally provide the most direct remedy for 
odor-based complaints rather than federal racketeering laws. However, 
because of marijuana’s classification as a controlled substance, property 
owners may utilize RICO in conjunction with state-law nuisance claims to 
gain federal jurisdiction. Even with federal jurisdiction, recovery remains 
limited to what is allowed by the state’s nuisance laws. 
For an odor-based claim to mature, the marijuana enterprise must operate 
in a manner that allows it to interfere with the rights of others.17 As a result, 
state and local regulations will influence whether odor-based complaints 
may mature. Stricter regulations that limit the amount of marijuana that can 
be produced or maintained in a location will reduce the likelihood of odor-
based complaints, whereas less stringent regulations that permit larger 
accumulations of marijuana in one location increase the likelihood of odor-
based complaints. Exploring nuisance laws and the regulatory schemes for 
state-sanctioned marijuana operations proves useful in understanding the 
outcome of RICO-based litigation. 
A. Nuisance Law 
If the state-sanctioned marijuana activity of one property owner 
interferes with the use and enjoyment of another’s property, the aggrieved 
property owner’s counsel would likely look to state nuisance law for 
redress before federal racketeering laws. The Restatement (Second) of Torts 
identifies three legally significant meanings of a nuisance, which—
generally—distill to conditions or activities that may be harmful or 
annoying to others.18  
The doctrine of nuisance consists of both public and private nuisances.19 
Public nuisance includes “an unreasonable interference with a right 
common to the general public.”20 Examples of public nuisances include the 
                                                                                                                 
 16. See Lester Black, Washington’s Weed Industry Has a Million-Pound Waste 
Problem, STRANGER (July 26, 2017), https://www.thestranger.com/weed/2017/07/26/ 
25307388/washingtons-weed-industry-has-a-million-pound-waste-problem. 
 17. See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2012) (stating RICO requires an injury to business or 
property); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821A cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 1979) (“[F]or a 
nuisance to exist there must be harm to another or the invasion of an interest . . . .”). 
 18. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821A(b); see also 50 OKLA. STAT. §§ 1, 2–21 
(2011); 50 OKLA. STAT. § 1.1 (2019), https://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/Deliver 
Document.asp?CiteID=72104 (effective Nov. 1, 2019).  
 19. RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OF TORTS § 821A(a); see also 50 OKLA. STAT. §§ 2–3. 
 20. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B(1). 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol72/iss2/7
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erection of structures that interfere with passage on public highways; the 
use of public spaces like parks or public squares; the navigation of 
waterways; or the existence of structures that affect the health, welfare, and 
safety of the general public.21 Today, state laws and statutes provide 
varying definitions of public nuisance, often without the criminal liability 
once associated with its common-law roots.22 An individual plaintiff must 
experience a harm that is distinguishable from the general harm 
experienced by the public to recover damages for a public nuisance claim.23 
In Oklahoma, a property owner must experience a “special injury” to bring 
an action based on public nuisance, meaning the injury of which the 
plaintiff complains must be in some way different from what other 
members of the public suffer.24 
A property owner lacking the “special injury” required for a public 
nuisance claim, however, may suffer an injury sufficient to assert a private 
nuisance claim. A private nuisance exists when there “is a nontrespassory 
invasion of another’s interest in the private use and enjoyment of land.”25 A 
private nuisance claim allows the plaintiff to recover for harm to the land, 
interference with its enjoyment and use, or harm to the plaintiff’s family 
and chattels.26 Private nuisances may include interference with not only the 
actual use of land, but also the value of the land or enjoyment associated 
with occupying the land.27 Nevertheless, the enjoyment of the land does not 
equate with emotional distress, which receives limited protection.28 A 
plaintiff may only maintain a private nuisance action if the defendant’s 
conduct “interferes with the exercise of the particular rights and privileges 
that he owns.”29  
Nuisance damages—both public and private—are limited to plaintiffs 
suffering “significant harm,” which means harm different than to be 
expected from “property in normal condition and used for a normal 
                                                                                                                 
 21. Id. § 821B cmt. a. 
 22. Id. § 821B cmts. b–d. 
 23. Id. § 821C(1). 
 24. N.C. Corff P’ship, Ltd. v. OXY USA, Inc., 1996 OK CIV APP 92, ¶ 27, 929 P.2d 
288, 295. 
 25. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821D. 
 26. Id. § 821D cmt. a. Oklahoma’s definition of private nuisance is unspecific and 
essentially includes those not within the definition of public nuisances. 50 OKLA. STAT. § 3 
(2011). 
 27. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821D cmt. b. 
 28. Id.  
 29. Id. § 821E cmt. a. 
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purpose.”30 Measuring “significant harm” is an objective standard based on 
“the standard of normal persons or property in the particular locality.”31 
Though a hypothetical “hypersensitive” person would be unable to recover 
based on events that others would not consider a substantial annoyance or 
disturbance,32 courts consider the characteristics of the particular 
community when determining whether the activity constitutes a 
“substantial” annoyance.33 
Complaints against state-sanctioned marijuana operations are likely to 
involve private nuisance claims about the odors associated with the 
production, storage, and use of marijuana on neighboring properties. Odors 
may constitute a nuisance when they pose a risk to public safety and health, 
or when they are “merely offensive and unpleasant.”34 Further, smoke may 
create an actionable nuisance claim, and precedent may allow for recovery 
for cigarette smoke.35 While a “fleeting whiff” of marijuana may not be 
offensive, at least one court has found that marijuana odor may become 
offensive to a reasonable person depending on the “intensity, duration, or 
frequency of the odor.”36 
Property owners who pursue nuisance claims against state-sanctioned 
marijuana activities often complain about more than a “fleeting whiff.”37 
While there may be little recourse for a property owner whose neighbor’s 
recreational or medical marijuana use is annoying on occasion, large-scale 
production facilities may produce an odor of sufficient duration, intensity, 
                                                                                                                 
 30. Id. § 821F. 
 31. Id. § 821F cmt. d. 
 32. Id.  
 33. Id.  
 34. 66 C.J.S. Nuisances § 51 (2018). 
 35. Id. § 49; see, e.g., Birke v. Oakwood Worldwide, 87 Cal. Rptr. 3d 602, 605 (Ct. 
App. 2009) (finding apartment resident sufficiently pleaded public nuisance based on 
cigarette smoke so as to withstand demurrer). But cf. DeNardo v. Corneloup, 163 P.3d 956, 
957–58 (Alaska 2007) (finding there was no error in lower court’s decision that there was no 
duty of tenant to refrain from smoking, landlord not liable for trespass, and smoking is not 
“ultrahazardous”). 
 36. State v. Lang, 359 P.3d 349, 351, 355 (Or. Ct. App. 2015) (considering probable 
cause for disorderly conduct in response to a report about odor of marijuana). 
 37. See Complaint at 9, Ainsworth v. Owenby, 326 F. Supp. 3d 1111 (D. Or. 2018) (No. 
6:17-cv-01935-MC) (citing “unmistakable skunk-like stench” and “thick, noxious smoke”); 
see also Amanda Chicago Lewis, Inside the High-Tech Solution for Smelly, Smelly Weed, 
ROLLING STONE (May 11, 2018, 8:12 PM ET), https://www.rollingstone.com/culture/culture-
features/inside-the-high-tech-solution-for-smelly-smelly-weed-630032/ [hereinafter Lewis, 
High-Tech Solution]. 
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and frequency to warrant a nuisance claim.38 For example, the owner of a 
5000 square foot marijuana drying facility in Oregon can accommodate up 
to 12,000 pounds at a time.39 The owner hired an engineer to design 
facilities consistent with the county’s odor-eliminating regulations while 
also accommodating large, six-ton shipments and protecting the owner’s 
investment.40 Even with these efforts, the owner did not stop the complaints 
but has avoided litigation.41 
B. State and Local Regulations 
In order to satisfy the preconditions for a successful common law claim 
for nuisance, state and local regulations must be lenient enough to permit a 
marijuana-odor nuisance to develop before a property owner can 
successfully use RICO to combat state-sanctioned marijuana operations. 
Since the Supreme Court’s decision in Gonzales v. Raich, which noted 
“enforcement difficulties” in preventing locally cultivated marijuana from 
being transferred to other states,42 states have designed regulatory schemes 
that prevent state-sanctioned marijuana from entering the stream of 
interstate commerce—in hopes of operating without federal interference.43 
As a result, states have limited the size and scope of permitted marijuana 
operations.44 More stringent laws limit the areas where a state-sanctioned 
marijuana producer can operate in a manner that is likely to interfere with 
the property rights of neighbors. Comparing states with legalized 
                                                                                                                 
 38. See Noelle Crombie, Marijuana Odors Bugging You? Annoyed Neighbors Have 
Few Options, Officials Say, OREGONIAN (Mar. 20, 2015), https://www.oregonlive.com/ 
marijuana/index.ssf/2015/03/marijuana_odors_bugging_you_re.html (“Smoking in public 
remains illegal, but there’s little city officials can do when it comes to marijuana smoke 
bothering the neighbors.”); Junnelle Hogen, Pot’s Pungent Odor Causing Quite the Stink, 
REGISTER-GUARD (Eugene, Or.) (Feb. 25, 2016, 12:01 AM), https://www.register 
guard.com/rg/news/local/34040437-75/as-oregon-pot-grows-proliferate-so-do-complaints-
about-plants-odor.html.csp (“But as Oregon’s legal recreational marijuana program unfolds, 
and more growers set up operation, homeowners find they have little recourse against the 
stench emitted by pot plants.”); Complaints About Pot Odors on the Rise in Maine, 
PORTLAND PRESS HERALD (Nov. 22, 2017), https://www.pressherald.com/2017/11/22/ 
raising-a-stink/. 
 39. Lewis, High-Tech Solution, supra note 37. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 22 (2005). 
 43. See Michael Cooper, Safe Streets Alliance & the Tenth Amendment: Intrastate 
Cannabis Markets, Interstate Authority & Political Consequences, 18 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 
195, 203–04 (2018). 
 44. Id. 
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recreational use—such as Colorado, Oregon, and Washington—to states 
maintaining legalized medical marijuana illustrates how regulatory schemes 
address the deficiencies the Court identified in Raich as well as how the 
regulations may prevent odor-based nuisance claims. 
Colorado began experimenting with limited-approval medical marijuana 
use in 2000 when the legislature adopted an affirmative defense for 
registered patients or caregivers facing possession charges.45 Eventually, 
Colorado adopted the first regulatory scheme for the commercial sale of 
recreational marijuana in the United States.46 In 2012, Colorado expanded 
its legalization of marijuana with Amendment 64 to the Colorado State 
Constitution, which decriminalized the possession, production, distribution, 
and cultivation of marijuana and related products.47 Amendment 64 
authorized local governments to “enact ordinances or regulations . . . 
governing the time, place, manner and number of marijuana establishment 
operations.”48 Local governments may also ban cultivation and 
manufacturing facilities and retail facilities by ordinance, referendum, or 
initiative if approved through a general election ballot.49 As a result, local 
governments in Colorado have authority to regulate marijuana cultivation, 
production, and distribution within their areas of influence. 
Oregon transitioned from legalized medical use to recreational use in 
2014 with similar restrictions to those adopted in Colorado.50 Oregon 
adopted a canopy system for outdoor marijuana grows that limits the size of 
production to a maximum of 5000 square feet for outdoor grows and 1250 
square feet for indoor grows.51 Also, Oregon regulates homegrown 
marijuana by providing its production, possession, and storage must be 
hidden from plain view of any public place. Oregon also prohibits 
marijuana processors and retailers from establishing operations in 
residentially zoned areas.52 
                                                                                                                 
 45. Sam Kamin, Medical Marijuana in Colorado and the Future of Marijuana 
Regulation in the United States, 43 MCGEORGE L. REV. 147, 147 (2012). 
 46. Id. at 151. 
 47. COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, § 16; see also Safe Sts. All. v. Hickenlooper, 859 F.3d 
865, 876 (10th Cir. 2017). 
 48. COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, § 16(5)(f). 
 49. Id. 
 50. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 475B.005 (West 2018); see also Noelle Crombie, 
Recreational Marijuana Sales in Oregon: A Timeline, OREGONIAN (Sep. 30, 2016), 
https://www.oregonlive.com/marijuana/index.ssf/2016/09/recreational_marijuana_sales_i.ht
ml. 
 51. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 475B.085(1)(a), 475B.096(2). 
 52. Id. §§ 475B.090(2)(c), 475B.105(2)(c). 
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Oregon intends for its state-based marijuana regulatory scheme to 
supersede contradictory municipal charters or local ordinances.53 However, 
city or county governments may prohibit licensed marijuana premises by 
popular vote.54 By 2018, eighty cities and sixteen counties prohibited 
marijuana production, processing, wholesale, and retail activities.55 Local 
governments that do not prohibit marijuana activities may impose 
“reasonable regulations” that include limitations on production, cost, sale, 
hours of business, public access, and premises licensure.56 However, 
“reasonable regulations” cannot expand beyond the state-dictated 1000-foot 
buffers between retail locations or other limits imposed on agricultural 
buildings.57 
Like Colorado and Oregon, Washington began experimenting with 
medical marijuana58 before legalizing adult, recreational use marijuana in 
2012.59 Washington adopted similar rules and regulations to those in 
Colorado and Oregon, including buffer zones and other protections.60 Local 
governments also have the authority to “make and enforce within [their] 
limits all such local police, sanitary, and other regulations as are not in 
conflict with general laws.”61 The Washington Court of Appeals confirmed 
the authority of local governments to enact regulations by holding that the 
state did not create an affirmative right to sell marijuana or remove local 
governments’ rights to limit marijuana retailers within their jurisdiction.62 
Rather than explicitly limiting local governments’ ability to ban marijuana 
sales, the legislature incentivized local cooperation through revenue 
sharing.63 In Washington, the legalization of recreational marijuana has not 
                                                                                                                 
 53. Id. § 475B.454 (“The[se] provisions . . . are designed to operate uniformly 
throughout the state and are paramount and superior to and fully replace and supersede any 
municipal charter amendment or local ordinance inconsistent with the[se] provisions . . . .”). 
 54. Id. § 475B.461(1). 
 55. Record of Cities/Counties Prohibiting Licensed Recreational Marijuana Facilities, 
OR. LIQUOR CONTROL COMM’N (rev. Jan. 11, 2019), https://www.oregon.gov/olcc/marijuana/ 
Documents/Cities_Counties_RMJOptOut.pdf. 
 56. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 475B.486(1). 
 57. Id. §§ 475B.105(2)(d), 475B.109, 475B.486(2). 
 58. Cannabis Action Coal. v. City of Kent, 322 P.3d 1246, 1249 n.2 (Wash. Ct. App. 
2014). 
 59. Emerald Enters., LLC v. Clark Cty., 413 P.3d 92, 95 (Wash. Ct. App. 2018). 
 60. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 69.50.331(8)(a) (West 2019). 
 61. WASH. CONST. art. XI, § 11. 
 62. Emerald Enters., 413 P.3d at 98. 
 63. Id. at 101–02 (“This amendment allows counties, cities, and towns to share in the 
financial benefits resulting from marijuana retail sales in their jurisdictions.”). 
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affected local governments’ ability to regulate the sale of marijuana within 
their jurisdictions.64 
Washington’s legislation is unique in that it also includes limitations 
regarding the presence of marijuana odors in housing units. Washington’s 
regulations place limits on the production, processing, and growth of 
marijuana to avoid activities from being readily visible or easily smelled 
from public or private property.65 This type of limitation on the presence of 
marijuana odor may limit many nuisance-based complaints in residential 
areas. If local regulations prevent marijuana activities from occurring either 
publicly or overtly on a large scale, local regulations will eliminate the 
activity before it significantly interferes with the rights of others. 
States that have only legalized medical marijuana vary in their legislative 
restrictions. Most states impose rigid regulations to control the market, 
prevent diversion into other states, and reduce the likelihood of illegal 
marijuana sales.66 However, other states take different approaches to how 
much authority local governments have to regulate. Two newcomers, 
Louisiana and Oklahoma, recently approved medical marijuana and their 
respective statutes exemplify the range of local regulation permitted. 
Louisiana’s strict production, consumption, and dispensary rules make it 
unlikely that local regulation will be necessary. Louisiana prohibits 
physicians from recommending smokable marijuana, and limits the medical 
conditions that qualify for a prescription.67 Louisiana also limits the 
cultivation and production of marijuana to two state university agricultural 
centers, which prevents private producers from operating in rural 
neighborhoods.68 Further, Louisiana limits the number of pharmacies 
licensed to dispense medical marijuana to ten in the entire state and dictates 
their placement within nine state regions.69 The Louisiana Pharmacy Board 
determines the appropriateness of a pharmacy location based on its 
potential to impact religious organizations, schools, charities, hospitals, 
military bases, and other institutions.70 Also, the selected pharmacies must 
provide documentation “that all applicable state and local building, fire and 
                                                                                                                 
 64. See id. at 96. 
 65. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 69.51A.260(2). 
 66. Cooper, supra note 43, at 204. 
 67. LA. STAT. ANN. § 40:1046 (2018). 
 68. Id. § 40.1046(H)(2)(a). 
 69. LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 46, § 2445(G) (2019), https://www.doa.la.gov/Pages/osr/LAC-
46.aspx. 
 70. Id. § 2447(A)(15)(b)(iii). 
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zoning requirements, and local ordinances will be met.”71 These strict 
regulations make it unlikely that a RICO claim associated with marijuana 
odors interfering with property rights will develop in Louisiana. 
Oklahoma’s medical marijuana rules are less rigid than Louisiana’s. 
Oklahoma limits possession to three ounces on one’s person, eight ounces 
in a residence, and six mature plants in a residence for licensed users.72 
Though licensed growers must meet licensing requirements, the statute 
provides “[t]here shall be no limits on how much marijuana a licensed 
grower can grow.”73 Licensed processors must follow state requirements 
and Oklahoma State Department of Health (OSDH) regulations.74 However, 
the statute does not place limitations on odor.75 Like most other states, 
Oklahoma includes a 1000-foot buffer zone between retail establishments 
and schools.76 However, Oklahoma limits local governments’ ability to 
regulate the location of retail marijuana operations. Under the statute, “[n]o 
city or local municipality may unduly change or restrict zoning laws to 
prevent the opening of a retail marijuana establishment.”77 Shortly after 
legalization, this language caused legal challenges in cities that sought to 
                                                                                                                 
 71. Id. § 2447(A)(6)(c). 
 72. 63 OKLA. STAT. ANN. § 420(A) (West, Westlaw through Sept. 1, 2019 of the 1st 
Reg. Sess. of the 57th Legis.) (effective Nov. 1, 2019). In 2019 the Oklahoma Legislature 
passed the Oklahoma Medical Marijuana and Patient Protection Act (also known as the 
Oklahoma Unity Bill) designed to provide clarification and to enact stricter guidelines for 
the state’s marijuana program. The Oklahoma Unity Bill did little to address the deficiencies 
outlined regarding the limits on production, but the legislation did address concerns about 
labeling, testing, and the impact on workplaces. Prior to the passage of the Oklahoma Unity 
Bill, the Oklahoma State Department of Health (OSDH) sought to enact more rigid 
administrative rules, but these efforts were unsuccessful and resulted in significant 
controversy. See generally Oklahoma Medical Marijuana and Patient Protection Act, H.B. 
2612 (Okla. 2019), http://webserver1.lsb.state.ok.us/cf_pdf/2019-20%20ENR/hB/HB26 
12%20ENR.PDF; see also Sean Murphy, Oklahoma Fast-Tracking Medical Marijuana, but 
with Pushback, APNEWS (July 10, 2018), https://apnews.com/48f40bdbeefb436abc83c59 
dc136b1fe; Sean Murphy, Oklahoma Health Department Revised Medical Marijuana Rules, 
APNEWS (July 27, 2018), https://www.apnews.com/44668d69099f497488d540d787ba844e; 
Catherine Sweeney, Pharmacy Board Fires Director; Marijuana Working Group Meets, J. 
REC. (July 25, 2018), http://journalrecord.com/2018/07/25/pharmacy-board-fires-director-
marijuana-working-group-meets/; Lauren Turner, Unity Bill Hits a High Note with 
Legislators and Advocates, OKLA. POL’Y INST. (Mar. 21, 2019), https://okpolicy.org/unity-
bill-hits-a-high-note-with-legislators-and-advocates/. 
 73. 63 OKLA. STAT. § 422(D) (Westlaw). 
 74. Id. § 423. 
 75. See id. 
 76. Id. § 425(G). 
 77. Id. § 425(F). 
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limit retail marijuana operations.78 However, the law is silent on local 
governments’ ability to regulate marijuana production or cultivation 
facilities. OSDH’s administrative rules require that commercial facilities 
meet local construction and safety codes.79 Oklahoma’s medical marijuana 
statute and related administrative code do little to protect property owners 
from cultivation and processing activities that may constitute nuisances. 
Considering the statutory bar on limiting the amount of marijuana a 
licensed producer may grow, Oklahoma may well have set the stage for a 
landowner to pair state nuisance law and RICO claims to challenge a 
neighboring operation that interferes with the use and enjoyment of that 
landowner’s property or diminishes the value of the property if he or she 
can satisfy all RICO requirements. If Oklahoma approves recreational use 
in the future without stricter regulations, the RICO option may be an even 
more attractive solution for aggrieved property owners because the 
expanded legalization would both increase the number of individuals who 
could consume marijuana and expand the market for the drug. 
III. Weedkiller: Understanding RICO 
Passed in 1970 as part of the federal government’s effort to eradicate 
organized crime,80 RICO allows both criminal and civil actions for 
engaging in racketeering activities.81 Section 1961 contains an extensive list 
of criminal activities, known as predicate acts, that constitute 
racketeering.82 The activities encompass almost any conceivable transaction 
involved in the growth, transportation, distribution, and sale of any 
controlled substance, but RICO’s application is not limited to illegal drug 
operations.83 Cases often involve fraud and target both large and small 
operations.84 RICO’s private right of action empowers individuals to serve 
                                                                                                                 
 78. Anna Codutti, As Some Ordinances Shut Out Marijuana Businesses, See How 




 79. OKLA. ADMIN. CODE § 310:681-6-2 (West, Westlaw, through rules published in vol. 
36, no. 21 of the Oklahoma Register dated July 15, 2019).  
 80. Murner et al., supra note 9, at 1620.  
 81. 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1961–1968 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116–53). 
 82. Id. § 1961(1). 
 83. Id. § 1961(1)(D). 
 84. E.g., Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply, Corp., 547 U.S. 451, 454–55 (2006) (alleging tax, 
mail, and wire fraud in internet tobacco sales scheme); Nat’l Org. for Women, Inc. v. 
Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249, 253 (1994) (asserting RICO against anti-abortion groups seeking to 
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as “private attorneys general”85 if the individual has been “injured in his 
business or property” by the racketeering activities.86 
A. Elements of a RICO Claim 
When the government employs RICO against a defendant, the 
prosecution must prove, under § 1962,87 that a person: 
(i) through the commission of two or more acts (ii) constituting a 
pattern of racketeering activity (iii) directly or indirectly invested 
in, maintained an interest in, or participated in, an enterprise, (iv) 
the activities of which affected interstate or foreign commerce.88 
Moreover, in a civil RICO claim, a plaintiff must prove the elements, an 
injury to property or business, and proximate cause.89 
 Under a RICO action, a “person” is “any individual or entity capable of 
holding a legal or beneficial interest in property.”90 RICO also requires that 
there be a pattern of racketeering activities, meaning at least two prohibited 
acts occurred within ten years.91 Further, the acts must be “continuous and 
interrelated,” not isolated criminal violations.92 An enterprise under RICO 
encompasses a variety of organizations and groups such as corporations, 
labor unions, or small groups of individuals associated together for a 
common purpose without a formal legal identity.93 Finally, the complainant 
must demonstrate the racketeering activity’s impact on interstate or foreign 
commerce, but the effect may be indirect or even de minimis.94 
Engaging in two separate but unrelated criminal acts is insufficient to 
meet the pattern of racketeering activities because RICO requires a pattern 
of activity that is “continuous and interrelated.”95 The Supreme Court 
articulated a two-prong test for proving a pattern of activity. First, one 
                                                                                                                 
prevent women from obtaining abortions); Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., Inc., 473 U.S. 
479, 484 (1985) (alleging mail and wire fraud as predicate acts).  
 85. Holmes v. Sec. Inv’r Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 269–70 (1992).  
 86. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2012). 
 87. Id. § 1962. 
 88. Murner et al., supra note 9, at 1622. 
 89. Safe Sts. All. v. Hickenlooper, 859 F.3d 865, 881 (10th Cir. 2017). 
 90. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1961(3) (Westlaw). 
 91. Id. § 1961(5). 
 92. Murner et al., supra note 9, at 1625–26. 
 93. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1961(4) (Westlaw). 
 94. Nat’l Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249, 258 (1994); see also Murner 
et al., supra note 9, at 1622, 1637–38. 
 95. Murner et al., supra note 9, at 1625–26. 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2020
454 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:441 
 
 
“must show that the racketeering predicates are related.”96 Second, they 
must “amount to or pose a threat of continued criminal activity.”97 While 
the circuit courts disagree as to how litigants must prove “relationship” and 
“continuity,”98 most circuits apply a “two-tiered analysis for the continuity 
prong, which focuses on the length of time and number of acts.”99 
RICO’s definition of enterprise broadly includes both legal and non-legal 
entities,100 public and private organizations, and formal and informal 
relationships.101 Informal relationships may constitute associations-in-fact 
when participants have “a shared purpose, continuity, and unity.”102 The 
enterprises do not have to be business organizations103 and do not require an 
economic purpose.104 At a minimum, the association-in-fact requires “a 
purpose, relationships among those associated with the enterprise, and 
longevity sufficient to permit these associates to pursue the enterprise’s 
purpose.”105 The broad definition of enterprise has limits and cannot be 
applied to municipal corporations, meaning RICO has limited use against 
government entities.106 
RICO prohibits four classes of activities: receiving or investing income 
received, either directly or indirectly, from racketeering activities;107 using 
racketeering to acquire an interest in enterprises engaged in “interstate or 
foreign commerce;”108 conducting or engaging in, as the enterprise’s affairs 
as an employee or individual associated with a racketeering enterprise;109 or 
conspiring in any of the above activities.110 Any claim alleging a conspiracy 
                                                                                                                 
 96. H.J. Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 239 (1989). 
 97. Id. 
 98. Murner et al., supra note 9, at 1627. 
 99. Id. at 1628. 
 100. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1961(4) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-53). 
 101. Murner et al., supra note 9, at 1631–32. 
 102. Id. at 1632. 
 103. Boyle v. United States, 556 U.S. 938, 944 n.2 (2009). 
 104. Nat’l Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249, 257 (1994). 
 105. Boyle, 556 U.S. at 946. 
 106. Lancaster Cmty. Hosp. v. Antelope Valley Hosp. Dist., 940 F.2d 397, 404 (9th Cir. 
1991) (“The RICO claims against Antelope and District fail because government entities are 
incapable of forming a malicious intent.”) (citing Biondolillo v. Sunrise, 736 F. Supp. 258, 
260–61 (S.D. Fla. 1990); N. Star Contracting Corp. v. Long Island R.R. Co., 723 F. Supp. 
902, 907-08 (E.D.N.Y. 1989); In re Citisource, Inc. Securities Litig., 664 F. Supp. 1069, 
1080–81 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); Massey v. Okla. City, 643 F. Supp. 81 (W.D. Okla. 1986)). 
 107. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (2012). 
 108. Id. § 1962(b). 
 109. Id. § 1962(c). 
 110. Id. § 1962(d). 
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in violation of § 1962(d) requires proving the elements of another § 1962 
violation.111 While RICO readily applies to individuals directly engaged in 
the operations of a criminal enterprise, the fact that RICO includes claims 
against individuals who participate in activities that support a prohibited 
activity may open the way for stacking additional charges against 
defendants.  
B. Civil Remedies and the Proximate Cause Requirement 
Section 1964 outlines the civil remedies available under RICO.112 
Federal district courts have subject matter jurisdiction to order appropriate 
remedies, which may include divesting participants’ interests in the 
enterprise, reasonably restricting future activities, or dissolving the 
enterprise.113 RICO authorizes both the U.S. Attorney General114 and 
private individuals to seek these civil remedies.115 However, the private 
individual must have been “injured in his business or property” by a § 1962 
violation.116 If the private individual succeeds, she recovers triple damages, 
costs, and reasonable attorney’s fees.117 Civil action does not require a prior 
criminal prosecution or conviction of the members of the criminal 
enterprise, 118 meaning a property owner can bring a claim against a state-
sanctioned marijuana operation even without a federal, criminal 
prosecution. A preponderance of evidence standard applies to civil RICO 
claims rather than the more stringent standard of reasonable doubt applied 
in the criminal context, which reduces the burden on civil plaintiffs.119  
A simplistic reading of RICO creates the impression that proving the 
elements of a RICO claim only requires proving that the marijuana 
operation violated the statute by engaging in racketeering activity and that 
activity injured property. However, the Supreme Court rejected such a 
                                                                                                                 
 111. Tal v. Hogan, 453 F.3d 1244, 1270 (10th Cir. 2006) (“By its terms, § 1962(d) 
requires that a plaintiff must first allege an independent violation of subsections (a), (b), or 
(c), in order to plead a conspiracy claim under subsection (d).”); see also BancOklahoma 
Mortg. Corp. v. Capital Title Co., Inc., 194 F.3d 1089, 1103 (10th Cir. 1999). 
 112. 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (2012). 
 113. Id. § 1964(a). 
 114. Id. § 1964(b) 
 115. Id. § 1964(c). 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 481 (1985). 
 119. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. Sites, 258 F.3d 1016, 1023 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[A] civil 
RICO plaintiff must prove his case only by a preponderance of the evidence.”) (citing 
Wilcox v. First Interstate Bank of Or., 815 F.2d 522, 531–32 (9th Cir. 1987)).  
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simple interpretation of RICO in Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection 
Corp.120 
In Holmes, the Supreme Court considered a securities-fraud RICO claim, 
pursued by the Securities Investor Protection Corporation, alleging a 
conspiracy to manipulate stocks.121 Looking to the language of § 1964(c) 
regarding an injury to business or property, the Court noted RICO’s 
language could “be read to mean that a plaintiff is injured ‘by reason of’ a 
RICO violation, and therefore may recover, simply on showing that the 
defendant violated § 1962, the plaintiff was injured, and the defendant’s 
violation was a ‘but for’ cause of plaintiff’s injury.”122 
The Court rejected this simplistic reading for not being the “compelled” 
construction based on legislative intent and statutory history.123 Congress’s 
heavy reliance on the Sherman Act in formulating RICO influenced the 
adopted construction.124 Adopting the language from the Sherman Act 
showed Congress intended to adopt the Act’s contemporary judicial 
interpretations, also later used in the Clayton Act, that rejected simplistic 
interpretation and incorporated common-law proximate cause principles.125 
Thus, the RICO civil claims require proximate cause.126 
Holmes identified three reasons why proximate cause is critical to RICO 
private action.127 First, less direct injuries make it more difficult to 
determine the degree to which the plaintiff’s damages are “attributable to 
the [stated] violation” rather than independent factors.128 Second, the Court 
sought to avoid “complicated rules” that would be required to allocate 
damages among various defendants, which may be voluminous or lead to 
“multiple recoveries.”129 Third, the Court articulated the following: 
[T]he need to grapple with these problems is simply unjustified 
by the general interest in deterring injurious conduct, since 
directly injured victims can generally be counted on to vindicate 
                                                                                                                 
 120. 503 U.S. 258, 266–67 (1992). 
 121. Id. at 262. 
 122. Id. at 265–66. 
 123. Id. at 266. 
 124. Id. at 267–68. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. at 268. 
 127. Id. at 269–70. 
 128. Id. at 269. 
 129. Id. 
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the law as private attorneys general, without any of the problems 
attendant upon suits by plaintiffs injured more remotely.130 
In addition to proving proximate cause, the property owner must prove 
injury to property or business.131 Proving injury to business or property can 
be tricky because the losses must be concrete rather than speculative.132 
Further, RICO does not provide recovery for personal injuries.133 Federal 
courts rely on state law definitions of injury to property, which further 
complicates matters.134 Some states, such as Oregon, include claims about 
diminished use and enjoyment of property within the definition of personal 
injury135 while others, like Colorado, incorporate use and enjoyment within 
the definition of injury to property.136 The reliance on state-law definitions 
for injury to property influences circuit precedent as well resulting in 
different types of injuries being recoverable in different circuits.137 This 
means property owners targeting state-sanctioned marijuana operations 
must look to their state law definitions of personal injury and injury to 
property before bringing a claim about the diminished use and enjoyment of 
their property under RICO. 
Jurisdictions consistently recognize diminished property values as 
injuries to property although some jurisdictions may require that a property 
owner either attempt to monetize the interest or at least express a desire to 
monetize such an interest by either attempting to sell or lease the affected 
property.138 Leaseholders face additional challenges in alleging injury to 
                                                                                                                 
 130. Id. at 269–70. 
 131. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2012). 
 132. Oscar v. Univ. Students Coop. Ass’n, 965 F.2d 783, 785 (9th Cir. 1992) (en banc), 
abrogated by Boar, Inc. v. Cty. of Nye, 499 F. App’x 713 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 133. Safe Sts. All. v. Hickenlooper, 859 F.3d 865, 885 (10th Cir. 2017). 
 134. Diaz v. Gates, 420 F.3d 897, 900 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 135. See Ainsworth v. Owenby, 326 F. Supp. 3d 1111, 1122 (D. Or. 2018) (“A 
defendant’s interference with a possessor’s ‘comfort and enjoyment’ of her property is a 
‘personal injury’. . . .”).  
 136. Hickenlooper, 859 F.3d at 886. 
 137. See Ainsworth, 326 F. Supp. 3d at 1122–23 (noting distinction between Oregon and 
Colorado law and impact on decisions in the Ninth and Tenth Circuits); see also 
Hickenlooper, 859 F.3d at 886 (“But Colorado also has long recognized that invasion of 
one’s property by noxious odors itself gives rise to a nuisance claim and is a direct injury to 
property.”). 
 138. Ainsworth, 326 F. Supp. 3d at 1124–25; see Hickenlooper, 859 F.3d at 887; Oscar v. 
Univ. Students Coop. Ass’n, 965 F.2d 783, 786–87 (9th Cir. 1992) (en banc), abrogated by 
Boar, Inc. v. Cty. Of Nye, 499 F. App’x 713 (9th Cir. 2012). 
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property if the claim is based on diminution of value.139 The Ninth Circuit 
previously noted that a diminished resale value does not affect a leaseholder 
because the leaseholder could gain from such a circumstance because a 
significant downturn in value would reduce the amount of rent expected of 
the leaseholder.140 
While proving injury to property presents challenges depending on the 
state law and circuit precedent, an informed property owner can tailor 
pleadings to meet the requirements needed to sufficiently plead a RICO 
injury to property or business. Establishing proximate cause will be key to 
success in a RICO-based complaint because the property owner not only 
has to prove that there was an injury to property or business but also that 
the criminal activity caused that injury. Property owners must keep both the 
elements of RICO and the practical difficulties of substantiating property 
damage in mind when bringing a RICO claim against a state-sanctioned 
marijuana operation in court. 
IV. The Initial Crop of RICO Cases 
When Safe Streets Alliance v. Alternative Holistic Healing returned to 
the District Court of Colorado on remand, other property owners and their 
attorneys took notice, and filed similar suits in federal courts in Oregon, 
California, and Massachusetts.141 These claims, including those in Safe 
Streets Alliance v. Alternative Holistic Healing, LLC, have proven 
unsuccessful thus far. Nevertheless, property owners in early cases had 
some success using RICO to either reach a settlement or to terminate the 
marijuana operation.142  
A. Cultivating Claims in Colorado 
Colorado was a trailblazer in recreational marijuana legalization and in 
the use of RICO to combat state-sanctioned marijuana operations. Parties 
brought two separate RICO claims in February 2015 in the District Court of 
Colorado: Safe Streets Alliance v. Medical Marijuana of the Rockies143 and 
                                                                                                                 
 139. Oscar, 965 F.2d at 786–87. 
 140. Id. 
 141. See Crimson Galeria Ltd. P’ship v. Healthy Pharms, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 3d 20 (D. 
Mass. 2018); Ainsworth, 326 F. Supp. 3d at 1115–16; Quillinan v. Ainsworth, No. 4:17-cv-
00077-KAW, 2018 WL 2151936, at *1 (N.D. Cal. May 10, 2018). 
 142. Court Docket, McCart v. Beddow, No. 3:17-cv-00927-AC (D. Or. Jan. 1, 2018) 
(referencing a Court Minute dictating that the parties settled and staying the case). 
 143. Complaint, Safe Sts. All. v. Med. Marijuana of the Rockies, LLC, No. 1:15-cv-
00350-MSK (D. Colo. Feb. 19, 2015). 
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Safe Streets Alliance v. Alternative Holistic Healing, LLC.144 A Washington 
D.C.-based non-profit organization, the Safe Streets Alliance145 (the 
Alliance), was a plaintiff in both cases and filed suit in federal court.146 The 
group joined with individual property and business owners to target 
individual marijuana producers.147 Though a former Justice Department 
official served as chair of the Alliance and a D.C.-based law firm 
represented the Alliance,148 the number and identity of its membership 
remains largely unknown.149 
Safe Streets Alliance v. Medical Marijuana of the Rockies involved a 
hotel seeking to prevent a marijuana dispensary from operating nearby in 
Frisco, Colorado.150 The complaint asserts that “marijuana businesses [are] 
bad neighbors” that discourage legitimate customers while attracting bad 
ones, create traffic disruptions, depreciate property values, and smell bad.151 
The defendants included not only the marijuana operation and its owner, 
but also the property owner who agreed to sell and lease the property to the 
marijuana operation; individual investors; the construction contractor; the 
Bank of the West, which provided banking services; a bond company; and 
the operation’s accountant.152 The court quickly dismissed the bank, which 
reported that it was not aware that the defendants participated in the 
marijuana industry.153 In June 2015, the court voluntarily dismissed the 
                                                                                                                 
 144. Complaint, Safe Sts. All. v. Alt. Holistic Healing, LLC, No. 1:15-cv-00349-REB-
CBS (D. Colo. Feb. 19, 2015), 2015 WL 5007944. 
 145. Ricardo Baca, Who Exactly Is Behind the Lawsuits over Colorado’s Legal 
Marijuana?, DENVER POST (Jan. 15, 2016, 10:56 AM), https://www.denverpost.com/2016/ 
01/15/who-exactly-is-behind-the-lawsuits-over-colorados-legal-marijuana/?clearUserState= 
true. 
 146. John Ingold, Jury Finds in Favor of Colorado Marijuana Grow in Closely Watched 
Federal Lawsuit, COLO. SUN (Oct. 31, 2018, 4:55 PM MDT), https://coloradosun.com/ 
2018/10/31/colorado-safe-streets-rico-lawsuit-verdict/. 
 147. See, e.g., Safe Sts. All. v. Hickenlooper, 859 F.3d 865, 876–77 (10th Cir. 2017). 
 148. Baca, supra note 145. 
 149. See id.; see also Hickenlooper, 859 F.3d at 879. 
 150. Complaint, Safe Sts. All. v. Alt. Holistic Healing, LLC, No. 1:15-cv-00349-REB-
CBS (D. Colo. Feb. 19, 2015), 2015 WL 5007944. 
 151. Id. at 3. 
 152. Id. at 5–6. 
 153. Ricardo Baca, Anti-Pot Racketeering Suit Settles, Opens Door for Future RICO 
Claims, DENVER POST (Dec. 30, 2015, 10:48 AM), https://www.denverpost.com/2015/12/30/ 
anti-pot-racketeering-suit-settles-opens-door-for-future-rico-claims/ (“One defendant, Bank 
of the West, was dropped from the lawsuit in February after it closed all bank accounts 
belonging to Medical Marijuana of the Rockies . . . and denied that it knew the nature of 
[the] business.”).  
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Alliance from Safe Streets Alliance v. Medical Marijuana of the Rockies.154 
In December 2015, the hotel settled with the marijuana operation, which 
had closed its existing operation due to the litigation, as well as with other 
defendants.155 The case’s short lifespan makes it difficult to identify many 
lessons-learned. Initially, a RICO lawsuit appeared to give property owners 
opposed to state-sanctioned marijuana operations leverage to push 
settlement, terminate the marijuana operation, or both. The expense of 
litigation and the stigma of being characterized as a criminal enterprise in 
court were powerful deterrents to marijuana operators. 
Unlike Safe Streets Alliance v. Medical Marijuana of the Rockies, the 
Safe Streets Alliance v. Alternative Holistic Healing, LLC plaintiffs refused 
to settle and inspired other RICO-based claims.156 In Safe Streets Alliance v. 
Alternative Holistic Healing, LLC, the Alliance joined with rural property 
owners, the Reillys,157 who, at the time they filed the lawsuit, used property 
that they owned in a rural development for riding horses and other 
recreational activities.158 A marijuana operation opened on a neighboring 
lot, and the Reillys alleged that the marijuana operation and its “noxious 
odors” harmed their property in two ways.159 First, operating an open drug 
conspiracy in the neighborhood affected property values, which constitutes 
an injury to property under RICO, and second, the odors from marijuana 
production interfered with the use and enjoyment of the property.160 In 
addition to the RICO claim, Safe Streets Alliance v. Alternative Holistic 
Healing, LLC, included an equity claim against the State of Colorado using 
the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution as a preemptive 
force to combat the state’s marijuana legalization regime.161 The District 
Court of Colorado initially dismissed the complaint because the Reillys had 
not sufficiently pleaded injury to property proximately caused by the 
marijuana operation’s violation of the Controlled Substances Act (CSA).162 
                                                                                                                 
 154. Notice of Voluntary Dismissal of Plaintiff Safe Streets, Safe Sts. All. v. Med. 
Marijuana of the Rockies, LLC, No. 15-cv-00350-MSK-MJW (D. Colo. June 15, 2015). 
 155. Baca, supra note 145. 
 156. See Safe Sts. All. v. Hickenlooper, 859 F.3d 865, 879 (10th Cir. 2017). 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. The Reillys later built a home on the property, which may have affected the 
jury’s verdict. Kathleen Foody & Associated Press, Lawsuit over Pot, Property Values 
Could Have Broad Impacts, DENVER POST (Oct. 28, 2018, 12:00 pm), 
https://www.denverpost.com/2018/10/28/denver-marijuana-property-tax-lawsuit/. 
 159. Hickenlooper, 859 F.3d at 879–80. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. at 876–77. 
 162. Id. at 880–81. 
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Although the Tenth Circuit upheld the dismissal of the equity claim in Safe 
Streets Alliance v. Hickenlooper, the court remanded the RICO claim 
because “the landowners [had] plausibly alleged at least one § 1964(c) 
claim against each of [the] defendants.”163  
On remand, the Tenth Circuit’s opinion provided guidance for the 
District Court of Colorado. First, the Tenth Circuit established that the 
marijuana operation was engaged in an activity that would be indictable 
under the CSA and therefore satisfied RICO’s definition of racketeering 
activity.164 Second, the Reillys sufficiently pleaded a shared “purpose, 
relationship, and longevity” and proved an “association-in-fact” enterprise 
existed under RICO.165 Third, the Tenth Circuit noted that the “cultivating, 
distributing, and selling” involved in the enterprise “undisputedly affects 
interstate commerce.”166 Further, the defendants, who admitted that they 
agreed to engage in activities to produce marijuana for sale, met RICO’s 
requirement that the individuals be engaged in the operation and 
management of the enterprise.167 Fourth, the plaintiffs sufficiently alleged a 
pattern of activity “that present[ed] a threat of ongoing criminal activity.”168 
Finally, the landowners sufficiently pleaded that the neighboring criminal 
enterprise and its odor interfered with their rights to use and enjoy as well 
as their property values, meaning the claim could proceed.169 
Equipped with the Tenth Circuit’s guidance, the district court granted 
summary judgment on the § 1962(c) claim in Safe Streets Alliance v. 
Alternative Holistic Healing, LLC.170 No genuine issue of material fact 
existed: the defendants were engaged unlawfully in an enterprise that 
affected interstate commerce and constituted a pattern of racketeering 
activity.171 In his decision, the district judge averred the landowners had to 
prove (1) violation of § 1962, (2) injury to business or property, and (3) 
causation.172 With regard to the § 1962 violation, the defendants only 
                                                                                                                 
 163. Id. at 877. 
 164. Id. at 882 (“It follows, therefore, that operating a marijuana cultivation facility of 
the type . . . described . . . necessarily would involve some racketeering activity.”). 
 165. Id. at 883. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. at 884. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. at 886–87. 
 170. Safe Sts. All. v. Alt. Holistic Healing, LLC, No. 15-cv-00349-REB-SKC, 2018 WL 
3861156, at *1 (D. Colo. Aug. 14, 2018). 
 171. See Order Re: Summary Judgment Motions at 15–16, Alt. Holistic Healing, LLC, 
No. 1:15-cv-00349-REB-SKC (D. Colo. Aug. 1, 2018). 
 172. Id. at 4. 
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challenged that a RICO enterprise existed.173 The remaining defendant 
controlled two limited liability companies (6480 Pickney, LLC and Camp 
Feel Good, LLC) that produced the marijuana for resale on the land 
neighboring the Reillys’ property.174 Claiming 6480 Pickney, LLC was an 
“alter ego,” the defendant denied that an enterprise existed.175 This 
argument was irrelevant, according to the district judge, because of the 
Tenth Circuit’s finding that an enterprise existed.176 The Tenth Circuit’s 
decision, as well as Raich, required the district court to find that the effect 
on interstate commerce existed.177 In addition, the district court also found 
that growing marijuana for sale is racketeering activity under RICO.178 The 
district court asserted that “[e]ach act of cultivation and sale constitutes a 
separate violation of the CSA and therefore a predicate RICO offense.”179 
Genuine issues of material fact existed with regard to injury to business 
or property and causation.180 The judge characterized the defendants’ 
evidence regarding improved value as being “somewhat thin” but believed 
it was a question for the jury.181 While the plaintiffs alleged the value of 
their property decreased due to the marijuana operation, the defendants 
alleged the opposite—proximity to the production increased the value of the 
land.182 
As Safe Streets Alliance v. Alternative Holistic Healing, LLC moved to a 
jury trial, the parties wrangled over experts.183 The plaintiffs presented a 
real estate professor whose meta-analysis and review of relevant literature 
resulted in an estimate that the Reillys’ property depreciated around 
$24,000.184 The defense objected to the plaintiffs’ expert witness, but the 
court rejected the defendant’s motion, admonishing it as “long on argument, 
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but woefully short on authority or analysis.”185 Under the evidence rules, 
the court stated that even a landowner without skilled training could be 
considered a “skilled witness.”186 Further, the court denied the motion to 
disqualify and also denied the request for the court to appoint an expert.187 
Before trial, the plaintiffs opposed the defense’s use of county tax 
documents that showed plaintiff’s property had increased in value after the 
defendants began their marijuana production because the assessor did not 
account for changes in property use on adjacent lots.188  
Safe Streets Alliance v. Alternative Holistic Healing, LLC demonstrates 
that experts are critical to the outcome of a RICO claim that alleges injury 
caused by state-sanctioned marijuana operations. Under RICO, injury to 
property “requires proof of concrete financial loss”189 as Congress did not 
intend “to provide a federal cause of action and treble damages to every tort 
plaintiff.”190 While the Federal Rules of Evidence may consider a 
landowner a “skilled witness” when it comes to valuing property,191 a jury 
will likely want more than the property owner’s assessment. Ultimately, the 
Reillys failed to convince the jury that the state-sanctioned marijuana 
production sufficiently injured their property.192 In Safe Streets Alliance v. 
Alternative Holistic Healing, LLC, the defendants ultimately scored a 
victory for state-sanctioned marijuana producers although that outcome 
seemed uncertain when the case first appeared. Initially the litigation 
caused distress among marijuana producers.193 The Reillys’ failure in Safe 
Streets Alliance v. Alternative Holistic Healing, LLC allayed fears because 
it now appears that proving a RICO case may be too difficult for many 
                                                                                                                 
 185. Id. at *2. 
 186. Id.; see also FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s notes to 1972 amendments. 
 187. Alt. Holistic Healing, 2018 WL 3861156, at *4. 
 188. Plaintiff’s Pretrial Brief at 2, Reilly v. 6480 Pickney, LLC, No. 1:15-cv-00349-
REB-SKC (D. Colo. Oct. 22, 2018). 
 189. Oscar v. Univ. Students Coop. Ass’n, 965 F.2d 783, 785 (9th Cir. 1992) (en banc), 
abrogated by Boar, Inc. v. Cty. of Nye, 499 F. App’x 713 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 190. Id. at 786. 
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Healing, LLC, 2018 WL 3861156, at *2. 
 192. Final Judgment at 1, Reilly v. 6480 Pickney, LLC, No. 1:15-cv-00349-REB-SKC 
(D. Colo. Nov. 8, 2018). 
 193. See Amanda Chicago Lewis, How Anti-Mafia Laws Could Bring Down Legal Pot, 
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-features/how-anti-mafia-laws-could-bring-down-legal-pot-206233/ [hereinafter Lewis, Anti-
Mafia Laws]. 
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property owners.194 The outcome informs what may occur in other RICO-
based claims; however, the outcome does not preclude all similar claims. 
B. Spreading Seeds in Oregon 
On June 13, 2017, six days after the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Safe 
Streets Alliance v. Hickenlooper, an attorney who owned property affected 
by a state-sanctioned marijuana operation in Oregon, withdrew a nuisance-
based state court claim and filed a RICO claim in federal district court.195 In 
McCart v. Beddow, the plaintiffs sued the owners and tenants on a 
neighboring property, three limited liability companies associated with the 
property, operators of retail marijuana facilities who purchased marijuana 
from the neighboring property, and the Bank of America, which held a 
mortgage on the neighboring property.196 The aggrieved landowners 
asserted many misdeeds by the parties, including damage to easements 
caused by increased traffic in the neighborhood, trespass and harassment, 
the creation of the “powerful and unmistakable skunk-like stench of 
marijuana” that prevented the landowners from using and enjoying the 
outdoor areas of their home, and the presence of guard dogs that interfered 
with the landowners’ horses.197 In addition to interfering with the use and 
enjoyment of the property, the landowners alleged the marijuana operation 
adversely impacted the value of the property because the illegal activities 
next door would scare away potential buyers.198 The landowners asserted 
twenty-three claims against the various defendants under either subsection 
1962(c), (d), or both.199 In January 2018, the landowners settled the suit.200 
The quick resolution of McCart provided little opportunity for the court to 
apply the law and showed the power of RICO litigation to force either 
settlement or termination of the enterprise. Like in Safe Streets Alliance v. 
Medical Marijuana of the Rockies, the defendant-marijuana producers in 
McCart likely sought settlement to avoid the cost of extended litigation and 
                                                                                                                 
 194. See Paul Elias, Colorado Jury’s Pot Verdict May Discourage Similar Property 
Value Lawsuits Against Cannabis Companies, DENVER POST (Nov. 1, 2018, 10:32 PM), 
https://www.denverpost.com/2018/11/01/colorado-pot-grower-property-value-lawsuit/. 
 195. Complaint at 1–2, McCart v. Beddow, No. 3:17-cv-00927-AC (D. Or. June 13, 
2017). 
 196. Id. at 3–8. 
 197. Id. at 27–28. 
 198. Id. at 30–31. 
 199. Id. at 31–61. 
 200. See Notice of Voluntary Dismissal with Prejudice Pursuant to FRCP 41(a)(1)(A)(i), 
McCart, No 3:17-cv-00927-AC (D. Or. Jan. 24, 2018). 
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the stigma of being characterized as a criminal enterprise that was engaged 
in racketeering activity.201 
In December 2017, a group of property owners in Butte Creek Estates, a 
rural, Oregon neighborhood, filed the second case in Oregon, Ainsworth v. 
Owenby. A nearby marijuana production allegedly damaged the properties 
in Butte Creek Estates in violation of RICO and state private nuisance 
laws.202 The defendants included the Owenbys, who owned the property 
where the marijuana enterprise operated; other individuals who participated 
in the operation of the enterprise; and the mortgage company.203 A “skunk-
like stench” allegedly pervaded over the neighborhood due to the operators 
burning “marijuana debris” and running exhaust fans in a greenhouse.204 
Due to the operation, traffic increased on the dead-end streets in the 
neighborhood turning the roads “into busy, and at times unsafe, commercial 
roadways.”205 Butte Creek Estates residents complained of a grass fire 
started by the marijuana production, the presence of guard dogs, increased 
traffic, and reports of prowling and break-ins.206  
Due to the drug trafficking in the neighborhood, Butte Creek Estates 
residents formed a neighborhood watch, purchased security equipment, 
installed new fencing, and acquired firearms.207 Because “dream” homes 
usually do not involve illegal drug manufacturing, loud noises, and awful 
odors, the marijuana production allegedly adversely affected property 
values in the neighborhood.208 Further, the residential zoning prevented the 
neighborhood from being attractive to other marijuana producers because 
local ordinances prohibited marijuana production in those zones.209 The 
private nuisance claim alleged that the defendants’ property was in a “rural 
residential” area, the production violated local ordinances, and the 
operation did not fall within the state’s “right to farm” laws.210 Other 
                                                                                                                 
 201. See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 492 (1985) (“[A] civil RICO 
proceeding leaves no greater stain than do a number of other civil proceedings.”). The 
Supreme Court has discounted the stigma that the label of racketeer may have noting that a 
RICO claim is no more stigmatizing than any other civil proceeding. However, media 
coverage of Hickenlooper indicates otherwise. See Lewis, Anti-Mafia Laws, supra note 193. 
 202. Ainsworth v. Owenby, 326 F. Supp. 3d 1111, 1115–16 (D. Or. 2018). 
 203. Id. at 1116–17, 1116 n.2.  
 204. Complaint at 9, Ainsworth, 326 F. Supp. 3d 1111 (No. 6:17-cv-01935-MC). 
 205. Id. at 10. 
 206. Id. at 15–16. 
 207. Id. at 16. 
 208. Id. at 17. 
 209. Id. 
 210. Id. at 30. 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2020
466 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:441 
 
 
complaints alleged the property owners suffered from physical ailments 
such as headaches and coughs.211 
In August 2018, the court dismissed the RICO claim without prejudice 
“because Plaintiffs fail[ed] to allege a compensable property injury under 
the civil RICO statute,”212 although the court allowed the Butte Creek 
Estates residents to amend their complaint.213 The court noted that to 
establish standing, the plaintiff must show an “injury-in-fact” that is “‘fairly 
traceable’” to the actions of the defendant that is “likely to be ‘redressed by 
a favorable decision.’”214 The Butte Creek Estates residents alleged three 
injuries including diminished property values, loss of use and enjoyment, 
and expenses related to security equipment, fencing, and firearms.215 
Because they had ceased marijuana production on the property, the 
marijuana operators alleged the Butte Creek Estates residents could no 
longer claim the first two injuries. Further, reimbursement for enhanced 
security measures like security systems and firearms were not injuries to 
business or property, meaning the expenditures were not compensable 
under RICO.216 
Absence of an allegation of a compensable injury, not a lack of 
constitutional standing, led to the dismissal without prejudice and leave to 
amend in August 2018.217 Constitutional standing existed under RICO 
because of “a cognizable injury-in-fact” arising from “the lost use and 
enjoyment of their properties.”218 Further, the plaintiffs had standing for 
past interferences due by smoke, noise, and odor in Butte Creek Estates.219 
However, the plaintiffs lacked statutory standing because the “impaired use 
and enjoyment of . . . land is a non-compensable personal injury.”220 
                                                                                                                 
 211. Id. at 30–31. 
 212. Ainsworth v. Owenby, 326 F. Supp. 3d 1111, 1116 (D. Or. 2018).  
 213. Ainsworth v. Owenby, No. 6:17-CV-01935-MC, 2019 WL 1387681, at *1 (D. Or. 
Mar. 27, 2019). 
 214. Ainsworth, 326 F. Supp. 3d at 1119 (quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 
555, 560-61 (1992)). 
 215. Id. 
 216. Id. The Ninth Circuit previously left open the possibility that expenditures for 
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In Ainsworth, the injury was non-compensable because federal courts 
rely on state law to define “property,” and Oregon distinguishes between 
injuries to property and personal injuries in nuisance claims.221 Oregon 
considers interference with one’s rights to use and enjoy property to be a 
personal injury, but decreased value or physical damage to property is 
considered to be an injury to property.222 This reasoning transferred to the 
federal court because the Ninth Circuit had adopted a similar distinction.223 
The court stated that although the claims brought by the plaintiffs in 
Ainsworth, were “actionable under Oregon nuisance law, such harms to 
human comfort [were] not compensable under RICO.”224 
Butte Creek Estates residents’ claims differed from those in Safe Streets 
Alliance v. Hickenlooper because the Tenth Circuit relied on Colorado law 
that did not distinguish between personal and property injury.225 Both 
Oregon law and Ninth Circuit precedent bound the Ainsworth court.226 The 
Ninth Circuit uses a two-part test to determine if a plaintiff plausibly 
alleged an injury to property.227 “First, the alleged injury must be to a 
recognized property interest,” rather than a purely personal or emotional 
injury.228 Second, there must be a “concrete financial loss.”229 In Ainsworth, 
the initial complaint lacked this type of loss. 
The court’s statements regarding security equipment fencing, and camera 
expenses describe how many property owners likely view proximity to a 
state-sanctioned marijuana operation. 
Plaintiffs in the present case cannot transform their apprehension 
of third-party prowlers into a compensable RICO injury simply 
by reaching for their wallets. Stated differently, it is not enough 
that Plaintiffs have alleged concrete financial losses because 
those losses are derivative of their emotional distress and not a 
property interest recognized under Oregon law—the financial 
                                                                                                                 
 221. Id. 
 222. Id. 
 223. Id. 
 224. Id. at 1123. 
 225. Id. 
 226. Id. 
 227. Id. at 1121. 
 228. Id. (citing Diaz v. Gates, 420 F.3d 897, 900 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc)). 
 229. Id. (quoting Oscar v. Univ. Students Coop. Ass’n, 965 F.2d 783, 785 (9th Cir. 2005) 
(en banc)). 
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loss is necessary but not sufficient to state a cognizable RICO 
claim.230  
As a result, the landowners’ RICO claim hinged on the loss in value of 
the property, and the court noted plaintiffs needed to include either efforts 
to monetize their property interest such as by sale or, at a minimum, the 
intent to do so.231 The court again looked to the Ninth Circuit and its 
treatment of speculative losses as a result of diminished value of 
property.232 While the Ninth Circuit has eased its requirements for concrete 
loss, the circuit still requires pleading the intent to monetize or failed efforts 
to monetize in order to establish a tangible loss.233 The Butte Creek Estates 
residents plaintiffs did not wish to sell or lease their lands, which left only 
an “abstract harm” based on a reasonable inference that the property values 
had decreased.234 To establish a reasonable inference, property owners do 
not have to have complicated statistics or expensive appraisals, but they had 
to provide more than just their own assertions that their property values had 
decreased.235 In the Ninth Circuit, property owners need to show attempts 
or desires to “convert . . . interests into a pecuniary form.“236 
Demanding either efforts or the desire to monetize interest provides 
another distinction between the Ainsworth case and Safe Streets Alliance v. 
Hickenlooper. While the Ninth Circuit precedent did not bind the Tenth 
Circuit’s decision in Safe Streets Alliance v. Hickenlooper, the two circuits 
approach proximate cause in a similar manner.237 The Oregon District Court 
found the Tenth Circuit’s analysis of proximate cause in Safe Streets 
Alliance v. Hickenlooper to be both persuasive and consistent with the 
Ninth Circuit’s three-factor test.238 
On September 28, 2018, Butte Creek Estates residents filed an amended 
complaint in an attempt to remedy the deficiencies in the alleged injuries.239 
This time, the complaint included an unfavorable home appraisal obtained 
when one of the Butte Creek Estates residents sought a home-equity loan to 
                                                                                                                 
 230. Id. at 1124. 
 231. Id. at 1125. 
 232. See id.  
 233. Id. 
 234. Id. at 1126. 
 235. Id. 
 236. Id. 
 237. See id. at 1127. 
 238. Id. at 1127–28. 
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finance a new fence the property owner was building in response to the 
marijuana operation.240 The home’s decreased value led to a smaller loan 
being available, and the property owners using a less secure and less 
attractive fencing than they desired.241 The amended complaint also 
included enhanced allegations of trespass by the marijuana enterprise and 
its animals.242 Further, the amended complaint detailed incidents of 
harassment and intimidation, including slashed tires, allegedly caused by 
the marijuana producers or their associates.243 In March 2019 the district 
court dismissed for failure to state a claim finding that the inability to 
secure a higher home equity loan due to a lower home value was not a 
compensable injury to property under Oregon law.244 Rather than suffering 
a concrete financial loss, the depressed home valuation prevented the home 
owner from acquiring greater debt.245 Further, the homeowner did not allege 
that the neighboring marijuana enterprise resulted in banks demanding 
higher interest rates or other unfavorable terms.246 As a result, Oregon 
seems to be an unlikely jurisdiction for a RICO claim to succeed largely in 
part to Oregon’s distinction between personal injury and property injury. 
C. Blowing Smoke in California 
Two cases in California further illustrate the challenges facing plaintiffs 
using RICO to target state-sanctioned marijuana operations. In 2017, 
antiques dealers, appearing pro se, filed suit in the Northern District of 
California asserting five claims under RICO and another federal claim 
alleging that more than sixty defendants engaged in criminal enterprises for 
the purpose of cultivating and distributing marijuana.247 In Quillinan v. 
Ainsworth, antique dealers rented storage space in a commercial 
warehouse.248 When a marijuana operation purchased the warehouse, the 
new owners gave the antiques dealers thirty days’ notice to vacate.249 
Unable to obtain an adequate, alternative storage facility, the antiques 
                                                                                                                 
 240. Id. at 13. 
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 242. Id. at 12. 
 243. Id. at 20–21. 
 244. Ainsworth v. Owenby, No. 6-17-cv-01935-MC, 2019 WL 1387681, at *1–2 (D. Or. 
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 246. Id. 
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Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2020
470 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:441 
 
 
dealers had to sell or dispose of property and relocate to less desirable 
facilities.250 The antiques dealers argued the purchase of the storage 
warehouse was the result of racketeering activity associated with marijuana 
cultivation and distribution.251 
The district court dismissed the initial complaint, but the Ninth Circuit, 
reversed and remanded.252 On remand, the district court “dismiss[ed] 
without leave to amend, because any amendment would be futile.”253 The 
court determined that the antiques dealers lacked standing because the 
termination of the lease was legal and did “not become a criminal act purely 
based upon the nature of the business or entity that does it.”254 The court 
distinguished Quillinan from Safe Streets Alliance v. Hickenlooper because 
the antiques dealers did not experience a nuisance caused by the marijuana 
operation’s odor or a reduced property value.255 The marijuana enterprise 
did not cause the antique dealers’ inability to obtain affordable alternative 
storage.256 Rather, the lost lease caused the injury, and any new owner 
could have terminated the lease, meaning this was not an injury caused by 
criminal activity.257 The antiques dealers appealed the dismissal to the 
Ninth Circuit; however, the court dismissed the appeal due to appellant’s 
failure to respond to a court order.258 
Quillinan is distinguishable from the other RICO cases that were 
inspired by Safe Streets Alliance v. Hickenlooper. First, the antiques dealer 
in Quillinan did not allege interference with the use and enjoyment or value 
of property due to marijuana odors. Rather, the antiques dealers alleged that 
a marijuana enterprise caused them to lose profits when they had to sell 
inventory at reduced prices. Second, the antiques dealers were not the 
owners of the affected warehouse but had a possessory interest per a lease 
and alleged an injury to their business. As a result, the antiques dealers 
failed to sufficiently plead the required injury to property or business.259 
In 2018 four families in Sonoma County, California, filed suit alleging 
that an unlicensed marijuana operation caused injury to their neighboring 
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properties.260 In Bokaie v. Green Earth Coffee, LLC, the complaint included 
familiar statements about the pervasive “skunk-like” odor of marijuana in 
the area.261 However, the injuries claimed included medical complications 
associated with asthma, disrupted sleep, and increased “cleaning, medical, 
legal, and other expenses.”262 Lastly, the four families in Bokaie alleged that 
the criminal enterprise in the neighborhood had negatively affected their 
property values.263  
Unsurprisingly, the court established the existence of a racketeering 
enterprise and the elements of a RICO violation.264 The court determined 
that “[b]y definition, growing or dealing in cannabis constitutes 
racketeering.”265 Despite this finding, Bokaie and Ainsworth had similar 
deficiencies. Like discussed previously in Ainsworth, the neighboring 
landowners in Bokaie failed to prove injury to their property or business.266 
The four families in Bokaie alleged personal injuries, like medical 
expenses, that are not permitted by Ninth Circuit precedent or California 
law.267 Further, the four families’ claim of diminished value failed under 
California law, which limits recovery for diminution of value in 
circumstances with continuing nuisances to avoid double recovery.268 In 
Bokaie, the nuisance abated when the marijuana operation ceased 
operations.269 In December 2018, the court dismissed the RICO claim 
without prejudice, allowing the parties to amend.270 Even if the plaintiffs 
had revised their complaint, any amendment probably would not remedy 
the flaws inherent in the claim in Bokaie, as the plaintiffs cannot recover for 
personal injuries, and the defunct marijuana operation was no longer 
affecting their property values. These inherent flaws likely motivated the 
four families filing notices of voluntary dismissal with prejudice in January 
2019.271 
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D. Abandoning the Crop in Massachusetts 
Though Safe Streets Alliance v. Hickenlooper appeared to encourage the 
plaintiffs in a Massachusetts case, Crimson Galeria v. Healthy Pharms, 
Inc.,272 to file a RICO-based claim, the jury verdict in Safe Streets Alliance 
v. Alternative Holistic Healing, LLC in October 2018 likely discouraged 
them from further pursuing the claim.273 Fewer than ten days after the Safe 
Streets Alliance v. Alternative Holistic Healing, LLC verdict, the Harvard 
Square property owners in Crimson Galeria filed to dismiss with prejudice 
all pending claims voluntarily.274 Although no longer pending, Crimson 
Galeria was perhaps the boldest of the RICO-based claims due to the scope 
and nature of the alleged injuries and damages. 
In Crimson Galeria, property owners in the Harvard Square area of 
Cambridge, Massachusetts, initiated civil RICO proceedings against the 
operators of a marijuana cultivation facility and a proposed retail dispensary 
in late 2017.275 The complaint asserted the distasteful conditions marijuana 
businesses bring to neighborhoods including foul odors, undesirable 
populations, and criminal activity that adversely affects property values and 
the ability to find suitable renters.276 Initially, the complaint included claims 
against state and local officials who licensed the operations.277 The court 
unsurprisingly dismissed those claims because the plaintiffs in Crimson 
Galeria, like those in Safe Streets Alliance v. Hickenlooper, lacked a 
substantive right to enforce the CSA and could “[]not invoke the [c]ourt’s 
equitable power through this lawsuit.”278 
The Harvard Square property owners claimed increased difficulty in 
attracting buyers or renters and the inability to obtain financing for a 
proposed expansion of a property due to the marijuana activities in the 
neighborhood.279 To prove their injuries, the plaintiffs relied heavily on 
experts such as a licensed real estate appraiser.280 The appraiser compared 
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 276. Complaint at 10, Crimson Galeria, No. 1:17-cv-11696-ADB (D. Mass. Sept. 7, 
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the “stigma” of association with the marijuana activities to that of 
association with “a drug and alcohol treatment center or groundwater-
contaminated property” and estimated the loss of value of $18,785,000 plus 
an additional $8,290,000 in lost profits.281 The Harvard Square property 
owners initiated the action before the proposed retail facility opened in 
December 2017 and later amended their complaint after the facility 
opened.282 
On October 5, 2018, the Harvard Square property owners filed an 
amended complaint against the remaining defendants.283 The Harvard 
Square property owners alleged injury to their property of approximately 
$29,064,200 as a result of the medical marijuana patients illegally selling 
their legally acquired marijuana on the property owners’ premises in 
addition to the associated odor, traffic, and noise caused by the marijuana 
operation.284 The remaining defendants included Healthy Pharms, Inc.; 
Timbuktu Real Estate, LLC; 3 Brothers Real Estate, LLC; two individuals 
with ownership interests in the three businesses; and Century Bank, which 
provided financing for Timbuktu.285 The amended complaint alleged 
multiple violations of the RICO statute and nuisance claims as well as a 
request for declaratory judgment.286 
The amended complaint also addressed weaknesses related to proximate 
cause that were evident in the court’s treatment of the initial complaint.287 
For example, the Harvard Square property owners emphasized the “open 
and ongoing” federal crimes as causing depressed market values and 
making the area less attractive to customers, renters, and potential buyers.288 
The complaint alleged the marijuana operation’s enterprise produced loud 
noises, impacted traffic, affected the safety of the area, and introduced 
undesirable odors.289 
To prove damages, the Harvard Square property owners again offered an 
expert real estate appraiser who believed the marijuana enterprise had 
“substantially diminished” the value of the Harvard Square property 
                                                                                                                 
 281. Id. Note that a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs would yield treble damages making 
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owner’s property making it difficult to find appropriate renters and buyers 
and reducing available financing for legitimate businesses in the area.290 
The Harvard Square property owners also alleged that the dispensary’s 
patrons were carrying out illegal drug transactions on the their property and 
provided photographic proof.291 As a result of the marijuana operations, the 
Harvard Square property owners experienced slowed development of 
residential units and banks provided less financing in spite of a normally 
robust market in the area.292 Experts presented by the Harvard Square 
property owners included an economist, noise consultants, and traffic 
specialists.293 In addition, the Harvard Square property owners had tangible 
economic losses—reduced financing for planned projects—to support their 
claims of injury.294  
The Crimson Galeria property owners abandoned their claims in 
November 2018, within weeks of the pro-marijuana operation verdict in 
Safe Streets Alliance v. Alternative Holistic Healing, LLC, although the 
property owners appeared to be better-situated than many of the other 
potential plaintiffs across the nation.295 Crimson Galeria involved an 
enormous sum of money, especially if tripled for RICO-based damages, 
experts in multiple fields, and evidence of the marijuana directly affecting 
established businesses in the Cambridge area.296 The quick demise of 
Crimson Galeria, especially so close to the marijuana operation’s victory in 
Colorado, may indicate that the use of RICO to combat state-sanctioned 
marijuana operations is not likely to succeed in court.297 
V. Evaluating the Harvest: Lessons for Potential Claimants  
While circumstances may arise that perfectly situate a property owner to 
use RICO to combat state-sanctioned marijuana activity, the RICO cases 
indicate that most property owners are unlikely to succeed.298 For those 
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who believe they may be perfectly situated, the current RICO cases provide 
some insight into the obstacles that property owners must overcome.299 As 
demonstrated by Safe Streets Alliance v. Alternative Holistic Healing, LLC, 
the issue of establishing a RICO violation for the cultivation, production, or 
sale of marijuana is likely to be one for which there is no genuine dispute of 
material fact, which means the issue may result in summary judgment.300 
As the Tenth Circuit explained, “Marijuana is a controlled substance under 
the CSA. So the manufacture, distribution, and sale of that substance is, by 
definition, racketeering activity under RICO.”301 Proving injury to business 
or property, and causation between the racketeering activity and that injury 
pose greater challenges.302 
As the RICO cases demonstrate, the alleged injury to property or 
business caused by state-sanctioned marijuana operations will likely be tied 
to nuisances created by odors associated with marijuana operations and the 
diminution of property value based on proximity to a criminal enterprise. 
However, property owners may not recover for “emotional, personal, or 
speculative future injuries.”303 While recovery may be available for 
infringing on the use and enjoyment of the land, property owners bringing 
claims under RICO must tie their damages to the value of the property. 
During the pleading stages, property owners may not have to provide 
experts to prove that their property value is diminished. However, Safe 
Streets Alliance v. Alternative Holistic Healing, LLC and Crimson Galeria 
show that experts attesting to the value of the property both before and after 
the marijuana operation commenced will be critical to success beyond the 
pleading stage.304 In some jurisdictions, such as Oregon and California, 
property owners will likely have to show that they sold property, rented it, 
or attempted to do so at a lower value than before the marijuana operation 
commenced. However, many property owners take legal action because 
they want to preserve their properties without being subjected to a state-
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sanctioned marijuana operation, which means they are unlikely to want to 
sell the property. 
Proving injury to business will also be difficult because such losses are 
often speculative. Quillinan and Crimson Galeria illustrate these 
challenges.305 In Quillinan, the dispossession of a rented storage space was 
insufficient to allege injury to business because the injury was of the type 
that could have occurred with any change in building ownership.306 The 
Harvard Square property owners in Crimson Galeria had a stronger claim 
based on banks reducing lines of credit.307 However, even the Harvard 
Square property owners in Crimson Galeria ultimately determined that 
pursuing the case was not worthwhile.308 The fact that legalized 
marijuana—especially recreational use—often results in increased property 
values for land suitable for producing or selling marijuana also makes 
injury to property difficult to prove.309 
A simplistic reading of RICO creates the impression that proving the 
elements of a RICO claim only requires proving that the marijuana 
operation violated the statute by engaging in racketeering activity and that 
activity injured property. However, Holmes stated otherwise by requiring 
proximate cause as an additional element of a § 1964 RICO claim by a 
private actor.310 As a result, property owners must prove both an injury to 
property or business and that the criminal activity caused the injury.311 The 
property owners in Safe Streets Alliance v. Alternative Holistic Healing, 
LLC failed to show proximate cause, and the property owners in McCart 
likely would have failed had the case not been settled—as was illustrated by 
the court’s dismissal in Bokaie.312 Ainsworth, which is closely related to 
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McCart, also failed to prove the marijuana operation reduced property 
values and caused injury to property.313 
RICO gives litigants access to federal courts under federal question 
jurisdiction;314 however, RICO does not protect a plaintiff from facing a 
potentially pro-marijuana jury. Marijuana legalization is becoming 
increasingly popular among the public,315 and states that have legalized 
marijuana have often done so in response to populist efforts. Convincing a 
jury that a state-sanctioned marijuana operation creates such a nuisance that 
it damages one’s ability to enjoy property or reduces its value is a daunting 
task—especially in areas like Colorado where property values have 
increased dramatically following legalization.316 The property owners in 
Safe Streets Alliance v. Alternative Holistic Healing, LLC could not 
convince a jury that the marijuana producers caused the injury.317 
Moreover, Safe Streets Alliance v. Alternative Holistic Healing, LLC may 
have led the Harvard Square property owners in Crimson Galeria to 
dismiss their complaint because they would have faced similar issues in 
Massachusetts, which began permitting recreational marijuana sales in 
November 2018.318 The jury verdict in Safe Streets Alliance v. Alternative 
Holistic Healing, LLC will likely reduce the number of RICO-based claims 
targeting state-sanctioned marijuana operations. 
Safe Streets Alliance v. Hickenlooper also demonstrates that RICO is not 
a useful tool to prevent states or local governments from legalizing 
marijuana.319 Safe Streets Alliance v. Hickenlooper initially included equity 
claims against the State of Colorado and a county government that alleged 
injury to property by licensing the marijuana operation.320 The Tenth 
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Circuit concluded that the plaintiffs lacked “any federal substantive rights” 
as to the state and county and upheld dismissal of the claims.321 Efforts to 
use RICO against the state and local government also failed in Crimson 
Galeria with the dismissal of a preemption claim.322 
However, the RICO cases demonstrate yet another reason why the 
federal government needs to address marijuana’s inclusion in the 
Controlled Substances Act. As more states legalize marijuana for either 
medical or recreational use, problems related to banking, taxation, 
employment, and criminal law continue to escalate. Landowners’ ability to 
utilize federal racketeering laws to attack what some states consider a 
legitimate business adds another layer of complication. The availability of 
RICO as a tool for landowners may needlessly create dissension between 
neighbors, expenses in the form of legal fees, and time-wasting federal 
litigation. Allowing state and local governments to regulate marijuana 
production based on local needs would best resolve these issues. 
VI. Conclusion 
In the wake of Safe Streets Alliance v. Alternative Holistic Healing, LLC, 
Oklahoma property owners face a daunting challenge when using RICO to 
pursue claims based on odor-related nuisances or decreased property value 
due to proximity to a criminal enterprise. Most property owners are likely 
limited to private nuisance claims in state court and working with state and 
local governments to establish sufficiently protective regulatory schemes. 
However, a perfect storm of injury and proximate cause could make RICO 
an incredibly effective tool for an aggrieved property owner in Oklahoma. 
Imagine, perhaps, a marijuana operation’s waste disposal processes damage 
a neighbor’s crops or livestock. If the aggrieved property owner could 
prove that the marijuana operation proximately caused “clear and definite” 
injury to his property or business, she could recover treble damages and 
attorney’s fees under RICO. 
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